Abstract
We contribute to the analysis of mergers in two-sided markets, in which a platform provides its service for free on one side but obtains all its revenues from the other. A structural model allowing for multi-homing of advertisers is developed to assess a decision of the French competition authority, which approves the merger of the broadcasting services of TV channels but prohibits the merger of their advertising sales services through a behavioral remedy. We show that ignoring the interaction between the two sides of platforms in designing competition or regulatory policy can result in unexpected outcomes.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Peer-reviewed scientific journal | The Journal of Industrial Economics |
| Volume | 70 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Pages (from-to) | 591-630 |
| Number of pages | 40 |
| ISSN | 0022-1821 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 26.03.2022 |
| MoE publication type | A1 Journal article - refereed |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 12 Responsible Consumption and Production
Keywords
- 511 Economics
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